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Abstract: This article examines Western European socialists’ attempt to assert a ‘socialist 
alternative’ to a crumbling world order during the long 1970s. In Western Europe, the 
1968 uprisings inaugurated a decade of intense social contestation, which coincided 
with the heyday of social democracy and, arguably, with a new leftward tendency within 
the socialist milieu. The ‘crisis’ of the long 1970s – with its multiple economic, energy 
social, political, international and cultural facets – challenged the foundations of the 
‘post-war consensus’ and to some extent pushed socialists to question their commitment 
to capitalism. This article explores the period of consolidation and renewal that Western 
European social democracy experienced during the early 1970s, their increasing 
confidence that they could use the European Community as a tool to realise democratic 
socialism, the attempt to formulate a common socialist alternative for Europe, the 
leftward tendency that was characterizing European socialists at the time and even their 
hope (at least for some of them) to surpass capitalism. Focusing on the attempt of the 
socialist parties of the EC to adopt a common European socialist programme in view of 
the first direct elections of the European Parliament, it argues that despite their 
divergences, European socialists did thoroughly discuss and envisage an alternative to 
capitalism at a European and global level during the 1970s, an option that was 
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At the beginning of the 1970s, Western European socialist parties formulated a project to build 
what they called a ‘social Europe’.i The idea, in short, was to use the European Community 
(EC) as an instrument to foster social progress in order to turn Western Europe into a model of 
social progress for the World. This ‘social Europe’ project relied on far-reaching proposals to 
sustain a number of fundamental principles that included economic democratisation, wealth 
redistribution, improved working and living conditions, guarantee of the right to work, upward 
harmonisation of European social programmes and access to social protection for all. It 
intended to empower the EC in the social field and to increase social and economic coordination 
between its member states. This project was supported at the table of world leaders by the 
prominent West German social-democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt. Shortly after, the outbreak 
of the crisis of the 1970s and the exhaustion of the economic stability that had characterised the 
post-war era – the ‘golden age’ of regulated capitalism – opened a period of frantic searching 
for new alternatives in Western societies. 
Far from nipping the idea of ‘social Europe’ in the bud, the crisis initially stimulated 
ambitious new proposals from European socialists and the broader European Left – a European 
Left that was by then stronger than ever. European socialists saw the crisis as an opportunity to 
reshape Western Europe along the lines of democratic socialism. They enthusiastically engaged 
new transnational cooperation efforts and tried to put forward new proposals for a ‘socialist 
alternative’ for Europe and the world – an alternative that would rely on a new international 
order with a leading role for an autonomous Europe, a pacification of the East-West relations, 
a redistribution of wealth from the North to the South, and a new model of development for 
European societies. During these years, European socialism was characterised by a leftward 
tendency. The questions of workplace democracy, of the extension of the public sector, of 
workers’ control, of social and economic planning and of a ‘rupture’ with capitalism were back 
on the table, and permeated discussions on the process of European integration. The question 
of an alliance of the European Left involving communists was open and hotly debated. 
This paper explores the socialists’ attempt to define a ‘socialist alternative’ at the 
European level during the long 1970s, and in particular their relation to the problem of 
capitalism. It first explains the changes that touched European social democracy during the 
decade, its electoral successes, ideological assertion and growing propensity to impact on 
European and world politics. It then discusses the leftward tendency that characterised social 
democracy in those years and argues that the question of a rupture with capitalism was not 
limited to its most ‘radical’ left-wing components. Focusing on the attempts to outline a 
common European socialist manifesto in view of the first elections of the European Parliament 
(EP), it then turns to showing the evolution of the socialists’ plans during those years and 
assesses to what extent European socialists effectively formulated a viable alternative. Finally, 
the paper analyses how this short-lived ‘anti-capitalist’ stance lost ground within European 
socialist circles and argues that their failure to build an alliance of the Left for a clear, radical 
socialist alternative opened the way to the emergence of a new form of capitalism during the 
1980s. As the introduction to this special issue pointed out, competing ideologies and economic 
doctrines coexisted throughout the history of European integration and contributed to varying 
degrees to shaping today’s Europe; this article reveals the existence, during the 1970s, of a 
project for a ‘social(ist) Europe’ that could have challenged, to some extent, the capitalist nature 
of European integration and its subsequent ‘neoliberal’ turn. 
 
Asserting a Socialist Alternative for Europe 
 
The 1970s can probably be defined as the golden age of social democracy in Europe. In 1969, 
the electoral success of the Social Democratic Party SPD in West Germany and Brandt’s 
accession to the chancellorship marked the beginning of a new era of confidence for social 
democrats. Brandt and his Swedish counterpart Olof Palme were joined in the pantheon of 
social-democratic leaders by the Austrian Social Democratik Party (SPÖ) Chancellor Bruno 
Kreisky in 1970, followed by the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) Prime Minister Joop den Uyl in 
1973 and the British Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1974. In Norway and Denmark, 
social democrats won landslide victories in 1971. In Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg, the 
socialists took part in several coalition governments during those years. Although France and 
Italy were immune to this impressive trend of success trend, the Left was growing there as well. 
In France, the ‘Union of the Left’ led by François Mitterrand just missed the presidency by a 
very small margin in 1974 (49.19%) against the liberal conservative Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 
but continued its electoral rise. In the 1977 municipal elections the parties of the Left won their 
best historical results. In Italy, where socialists suffered from the competition of the most 
powerful communist party of the western world and where the authority of Christian democrats 
remained unchallenged throughout the decade, socialists nonetheless took part in several 
governments. Although the trend differed from one party to the other, in several countries like 
France, Sweden and West Germany socialists were also increasing their membership during the 
1970s.ii 
The long decade that followed the ‘events’ of 1968 was also characterised, as is well 
known, by a revival of social and workers’ movements: labour and student mobilisations came 
hand in hand with a renewal of feminism, environmentalism, Marxism, anti-racist and anti-
imperialist movements, which climaxed throughout Europe during those years. Social protest 
and popular impulse for political participation was more intense than it had ever been in the 
post-war era and led in most countries to a series of important victories. In Italy, for instance, 
although the Christian democrats remained in power throughout the decade, the 1970s saw the 
creation of factory, neighbourhood and school councils, the approval of the Workers’ Statute, 
pension reform, the divorce and abortion laws, as well as important reforms of the health and 
education systems.iii This political shift to the left was perceptible throughout Western Europe, 
although it led to different results in every country.iv  
The revival of working-class militancy, the rise of the student movement and of the so-
called ‘new Left’ social movements and of the Marxist intellectual tradition in Western 
European universities posed many challenges to the ‘old Left’ and would transform the social 
democratic parties in the 1970s. The shop-floor militants and new Left activists raised new 
demands, such as increased democracy and self-determination and improved working and 
living conditions, that social democrats somehow needed to integrate into their own agenda. 
Thus, the question of workers’ control and ‘economic democracy’ became particularly salient 
during these years. In 1970 already, the newly-elected Kreisky announced a new phase in the 
history of social democracy: that of “surpassing the welfare state” towards the “democratization 
of all life spheres” that the new generations were calling for.v  
In a way, the challenge posed by the new social movements and by the political and 
economic changes of the 1970s were an opportunity for European socialists to add new strings 
to their bow in order to reassert themselves on the European political scene. As Michele Di 
Donato showed, the early 1970s saw a new “ideological offensive” launched by European 
socialists, who committed themselves to designing a new socialist alternative to both the 
conservatives of the West and to the communists of the East. This socialist alternative was built 
on a series of new ideas, personalities and achievements. It relied on the reassertion of the 
Socialist International (SI)’s role in the world, for which European social democrats were 
actively working. Three prominent leaders – Brandt, Kreisky, and Palme – met regularly during 
these years and were particularly active in promoting a new role for social democracy in highly 
important global themes such as détente, peace, development, and the North-South relations (a 
topic that had become hotly debated with the emergence of a union of Third World countries 
struggling for a global redistribution of power and wealth). The idea of a redefinition of the 
world order, and in particular of the North-South relations, was also advocated by the Dutch 
Prime Minister Joop Den Uyl, encouraged in that direction by the Nieuw Links (‘new left’) that 
had won over the majority of his party since 1969. At the same time, the German government 
was initiating a new rapprochement policy towards the East: The famous Ostpolitik that would 
earn Brandt a Nobel Price for Peace in 1971 and played an important role in establishing the 
reputation and confidence of social democrats, and in reinforcing the credibility of a socialist 
alternative in international relations. Finally, the idea of a socialist alternative relied on a new 
assertiveness towards the United States, whose leadership over the world was declining. Social 
democrats did not question the alliance with the dominant America but advocated a more 
autonomous and critical stance, in particular regarding the centrality of the US and the dollar 
in the international economic and monetary system. In sum, these years saw the affirmation of 
what Di Donato called “a new world vision of social democracy”. vi  
The new vision for a socialist alternative has to be also understood against the backdrop 
of a new dynamic for European institutions after the December 1969 Hague Summit that 
announced a ‘relaunch’ of the European integration process along the lines of ‘completion’, 
‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ of the EC.vii With the new perspectives of enlargement to countries 
– the UK and Denmark in particular – where the Left was strong, with the commitment to 
develop common European social and regional policies and to influence the definition of the 
world order through the development of a common foreign policy and of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), it seemed increasingly plausible that the EC could become a powerful 
and useful tool to reinforce social democracy in Europe. This new confidence was both the 
condition and the result of the ‘European turn’ that most left-wing parties had undergone by the 
early- to mid-1970s. With the notable exception of the British Labour Party – which 
campaigned against joining the EC on the terms negotiated by Edward Heath’s government in 
the early 1970s and remained split on the issue even after the 1975 referendum – and of the 
Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), most West European socialist parties were 
now strongly on board the EC. Meanwhile, the fall of the authoritarian regimes in southern 
Europe between 1974 and 1976 created new opportunities for socialists in Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, and with those countries’ application to join the EC, would soon increase the European 
Left’s hopes to weigh more decisively in Europe and on the EC.viii 
The possibility of a socialist alternative was made more tangible by the evolution of 
Western communist parties, which were undergoing important changes at the time. The mid-
1970s indeed saw a rising or continued strength of communist parties in some important 
Western European countries – in particular in Italy, but also in France, Spain and Portugal – 
and their alliance in a new political project: ‘Eurocommunism’.ix The Italian Communist Party 
(PCI) was the main promoter of this project, which climaxed in the mid-1970s. Under the 
leadership of Enrico Berlinguer, General Secretary since 1972 and one of the most popular 
politicians in Italian history, the PCI renewed its efforts to increase cooperation between 
Western European communist parties and to bring them around to the idea of a ‘third way’ 
between social-democracy and Soviet communism. Increasingly, ‘Europe’ became one of the 
core points of reference of the PCI’s international outlook; by adopting a new strategy and 
working inside the national and European institutional framework, the party believed it would 
contribute to the progression of a new socialism in Western Europe.x The EC was an important 
point of debate between the parties and an important – although contentious – aspect of 
Eurocommunism. The PCI worked to convince the other parties, especially the reluctant French 
Communist Party (PCF), to engage on the same European policy as it did and presented the EC 
as the test case on which all Western European communist parties needed to constructively 
converge.xi The joint declarations issued between 1975 and 1977 by the PCI, the Spanish 
Communist Party (PCE) and the PCF explicitly indicated the intent of Western European 
communist parties to seal a large progressive and democratic alliance to allow new orientations 
to be taken both at the national and the European levels.xii In the communist parties’ view, 
“[t]he development of solid, lasting co-operation among communists and socialists 
constitute[d] the basis for this broad alliance”, which should aim at isolating the forces of social 
conservatism and reaction and should include communists, socialists, social democrats, or even 
Christian democrats.xiii Against this changing background, the prospect of an alliance of the 
Left for a socialist alternative in Europe became – at least in theory – increasingly plausible. 
Furthermore, the economic crisis of the 1970s, epitomized by the October 1973 ‘oil 
shock’, was understood by many on the Left as an opportunity for the advent of a socialist 
alternative in Europe. Richard Nixon’s decision to suspend the convertibility of the US dollar 
into gold, the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, growing monetary 
instability, increasing prices of oil and other raw materials, increased competition from foreign 
markets, the 1974-75 economic recession and the combined emergence of inflation and 
employment all seemed to signal the exhaustion of the conditions that had underpinned the 
West’s development during the ‘Trente Glorieuses’.xiv  Many saw in these events the symptoms 
of a serious crisis that struck the capitalist system as a whole. The crisis that shook the Western 
economy exacerbated monetary, political, and social disorders in Western Europe – strikes and 
social unrest continued to be widespread throughout the 1970s – therefore reinforcing the 
confidence of the Left. Meeting in December 1973 in Schlagenbad, Brandt, Kreisky and Palme 
discussed how the oil crisis could reinforce European social democracy, pave the way for an 
expansion of the energy sector and public transportation network, and open new possibilities 
for economic planning and wealth redistribution.xv 
Furthermore, the crisis of the 1970s, by emphasising the interconnectedness of 
European and global economies and by exacerbating the relevance of economic issues, 
contributed to bringing social democrats to try and formulate jointly a socialist alternative to 
the model of ‘welfare capitalism’ that had characterised the post-war era. Increasingly in those 
years, the very question of the relation to capitalism was reopened as part of a leftward tendency 
perceptible in Western European socialist spheres. 
 
European Social Democracy Turns Left? 
 
Within European social democracy, different currents had of course always coexisted. During 
the 1970s, the parties of the social democratic milieu underwent significant changes, among 
which the strengthening and radicalization of the left-leaning currents was particularly 
noteworthy. New, radical tendencies were at work in all social democratic parties. The ‘old 
Left’ was permeated by the ideological thrust that came from the European movements of 1968 
– in particular through an influx of newly recruited members in the parties’ youth sections. 
John Callaghan has studied in detail the leftward tendency that characterized social 
democracy during those years. In France, the explosion of discontent which began in May 1968 
signalled the emergence of a left-radicalism that strongly influenced left-wing parties and 
unions in the following decade. Following the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière  
(SFIO) launching of an internal reorganization process and opening itself up to new components 
of the Left at the end of the 1960s, the famous Epinay Congress of 1971 marked a stark shift to 
the left for French socialism. The new united Parti Socialiste (PS) led by the newly named party 
secretary François Mitterrand adopted a decisively radical rhetoric and notoriously warned that 
“one who is not willing to break (…) with capitalist society, that person, I say, cannot be a 
member of the Socialist Party”. The new leadership of the party advocated increased public 
intervention in the economy and extension of public ownership to the banking and financial 
sector as well as strategic industries.  Under the growing influence of Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement’s left-leaning Centre d’Etudes, de Recherche et d’Education Socialistes 
(CERES), it took over several demands of the ‘new Left’, such as self-management 
(‘autogestion’), conceived as a counterpart to increased statist measures, or control of 
multinational companies. At Epinay, the French socialists also chose a strategy of alliance with 
the communists, the so-called ‘Union of the Left’ that would translate into the co-signature of 
the ‘Common Programme’ in 1972.xvi 
In West Germany too, the leftward tendency was perceptible. Under the influence of the 
radical Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (APO), and following the adhesion of a number of 
students and leaders of the new movements, the Jusos, the young socialists of the SPD, 
underwent a remarkable radicalisation. By 1969, they adopted a starkly critical position on the 
1959 Bad Godesberg programme that had marked the SPD’s abandoning of a class-party 
perspective, on the party’s Grand Coalition strategy and on many of its political positions. The 
Jusos often used a Marxist vocabulary, defined themselves as supporters of “socialism, 
feminism and internationalism”, insisted on turning the SPD again into a “workers’ party”, 
pressed for mass social mobilization, advocated anti-capitalist structural reforms and worked 
to hegemonize their views within the party. Even at the local and at the parliamentary level, the 
Left was getting more assertive.xvii   
In the UK, the left wing of the Labour Party had been growing since the mid-1960s and 
managed to gain particular influence within the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) 
and policy-making committees by the mid-1970s. An ‘Alternative Economic Strategy’ emerged 
that centred on reflation policy, wealth redistribution, public ownership of key firms and 
financial institutions, workplace democracy, economic planning and industrial reconversion, 
control over multinational companies, capital flows and trade exchanges. This new thrust was 
supported in particular by the rank-and-file of the party, the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) and 
the many trade unions affiliated to the Labour Party, the left-leaning ‘Tribune group’ of Labour 
MPs and various groups affiliated to the party, who were increasingly critical regarding the 
party’s commitment to the revisionist model of Keynesian social democracy, and were putting 
the fight for the control of the means of production and for economic planning back on the 
agenda. xviii  A leading figure of the Labour Left was Tony Benn who, together with the 
economist Stuart Holland, promoted this new economic policy even through the channel of the 
SI – which they criticized for its acceptance of liberal capitalism – and advocated new forms of 
cooperation between communist and socialist forces willing to attempt a programme of socialist 
transformation.xix  
In Greece, after the fall of the military regime in 1975, the growing socialist party 
PASOK distinguished itself by its plain Marxist vocabulary; whereas in Spain the socialists 
defined their ideology as Marxist as late as 1977. In Sweden, between 1968 and 1976 the social 
democrats, with the support of the unions, were challenging the power of private capital and 
seeking to extend economic democracy through a series of reforms such as the Security of 
Employment Act of 1975, the Joint Regulation of Working Life Act in 1976, and the 1976 
Meidner Plan, a wage-earner fund proposal. In the Netherlands, the PvdA was also becoming 
more radical under the influence of new Left and became much more incisive on gender and 
environment issues, and the need to transform capitalism.xx 
 These new, more ‘radical’ components of the social-democratic milieu of course 
coexisted with other currents to their right. Michele Di Donato argued that one can identify 
three distinct tendencies within European socialism during of the 1970s. Contrary to the ‘radical’ 
components, a ‘mainstream’ element defended the social-democratic (revisionist) tradition and 
insisted on maintaining autonomy vis-à-vis the communists. This ‘mainstream’ group, 
according to Di Donato, could itself be divided into two subcategories: those who, like Brandt, 
Kreisky and Palme, followed the lines of the social-democratic ‘ideological offensive’ 
described above; and those who instead were undergoing a shift to the right, like Helmut 
Schimdt (who succeeded to Brandt to the German chancellery in 1974) and James Callaghan 
(Foreign Secretary in Harold Wilson’s Labour government from 1974 to 1976, then Prime 
Minister until the electoral defeat of 1979). The former saw the crisis as an opportunity to 
establish the socialist alternative and embraced the idea of a new economic model consonant to 
the Third World’s demands for a new international economic order that would initiate a 
redistribution of wealth and power from the North to the South. On the contrary, Schmidt was 
much more prone to restoring the West’s role in the international economic order and to 
encouraging increasing liberalisation of global markets, in strong alliance with the US and with 
Giscard d’Estaing’s France. He in fact reduced development aid towards developing countries 
and backed the US effort to block the Third World’s proposals within the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). xxi 
The lines between these different currents were not however so clear-cut, and a close 
look at the debates within the international and European socialist circles reveals that the 
questions raised by the ‘radical’ socialists were extensively discussed in every party. Economic 
democracy and workers’ control, economic planning and the extension of the public sector, the 
need to control multinationals and the financial sector, the claims for a new international 
economic order and for a democratization – or a rejection – of the European integration process. 
Even the opening towards the communist forces of the West and the intent to build an alliance 
of socialist and communist forces was not purely confined to the left wing of the SI.
xxiii
xxii There 
was a simple reason to this: during the 1970s European socialist parties were confronted not 
only with the demands arising from the new movements but also, especially after 1973, to a 
changing economic context in which they had to formulate new solutions. Since the Second 
World War, European socialists had come to terms with a model of “managed capitalism” that 
had relied on constant new investment and economic growth and had supported full 
employment and growing welfare states. It had afforded social democracy a key role, since the 
development of the welfare states and of workers’ rights had played an important role in 
stabilizing capitalism. The crisis of the 1970s was a crisis of this particular model of regulated 
capitalism; by challenging the bases of this broadly Keynesian post-war settlement, ‘stagflation’ 
and growing unemployment challenged the model that social-democratic parties had been 
building upon. The crisis therefore initially brought European socialists to engage with a new 
struggle for the reorganisation of capitalist relations and for an extension of democracy.  The 
question of suppressing capitalism, which had become redundant in the vision of most West 
European reformist socialists in the post-war era, suddenly resurfaced as a vital question. 
The positions of some of the leading figures of the Dutch PvdA are a case in point. Sicco 
Mansholt, a salient figure of European social democracy and a European Commissioner for 
Agriculture who had provoked strong protests by farmers with his architecture of the CAP, 
would in those years cause great surprise as he started explicitly advocating a rupture with 
capitalism.
xxvii
xxiv Between 1968 and 1973, at the end of his career, Mansholt turned increasingly 
towards far-left ideas, his tone became more radical, and he became used to quoting radical eft-
wing intellectuals like Herbert Marcuse as intellectual reference points. In 1971, he was deeply 
shaken by the highly explosive report Limits to Growth, ordered by the Club of Rome, which 
attracted global public attention for its alarming assessment of some of the consequences of 
growth such as pollution, famine, and on the unrestrained conduct of multinationals. The report 
suggested that at the then current pace of growth, most of the world’s natural resources would 
run out within ten to thirty years.xxv Mansholt then basically started fervently preaching ‘zero 
growth’; by 1971 he reached the conclusion that capitalism was simply unable to come up with 
the proper solutions for larger world issues and argued on several occasions that a ‘second Marx’ 
was needed to solve the present problems of the world; he became particularly sensitive to the 
cause of the Third World, advocated a reversal of growth in rich countries to the advantage of 
poor countries and a better world division of labour.xxvi In short, he advocated a ‘new Socialism’ 
that could no longer restrict itself to correcting capitalism. In January 1972, he declared on a 
Dutch TV broadcast, “I am coming to the conclusion that a solution to the great problems of 
our times can no longer be reached within the Capitalist system”.  
Mansholt actively promoted these ideas when he became President of the Commission 
between 1972 and 1973 and urged his colleagues to work out a new policy agenda for the 
European Communities. He attracted much media and political attention, especially among the 
youth, and engaged into public debates with important figures of the intellectual Left such as 
Marcuse himself.xxviii He played a particularly relevant role in trying to turn the European 
Community (EC) into a privileged partner for the Third World.xxix His positions were also 
intensively discussed – and met with more or less enthusiasm – in transnational socialist 
networks. Among the socialist parties of the EC, which organised several meetings to discuss 
Mansholt’s letter and its reactions, it gave rise to fundamental discussions about the viability of 
the capitalist system and the need to adopt a ‘socialist action programme’ to face the new world 
challenges. The participants of these meetings sometimes showed almost euphoric enthusiasm 
for Mansholt’s new ideas and the perspectives that were opening for social democracy.xxx 
Wrapping up an exchange of views in May 1972 between Mansholt, the Bureau of the socialist 
parties of the EC and the Socialist Group of the European Parliament (SGEP), for instance, the 
president of the SGEP Francis Vals exclaimed: “Les socialistes peuvent jouer là le rôle 
historique de notre génération”.
xxxii
xxxi In the SI however, Mansholt’s ideas, especially the ‘zero 
growth’ concept, received mixed reactions.  
In short, with 1968 and the persistence of social and political movements during the 
1970s, with the emergence of the Third Worldist movement and the outbreak of the economic 
crisis, a new ‘anti-capitalist’ sensibility seemed to spread in the European Left. The impact of 
this new ‘common sense’ varied according to each national and local situation, but it was not 
restricted to the young and ‘radical’ components of social democracy. The very question of the 
relationship that social democracy should entertain with capitalism was back on the table. The 
convergence of left-wing forces on the objective of surpassing capitalism, with the thrust of 
social and workers’ movements, no longer seemed like a complete utopia. It remained unclear 
however how such a convergence could happen. The decision of the December 1974 European 
Paris Summit to organise the first direct elections of the European Parliament (EP) ‘in or after 
1978’ provided an opportunity for West European socialists to engage in a serious debate on 
the economic nature of the socialist alternative and try to tackle the problem. 
 
A common European Socialist Programme: Contesting Capitalism? 
 
The social democrats’ new ideological assertion came hand in hand with renewed efforts to 
achieve greater transnational coordination and to define a common political line at European 
level. Convinced that Western Europe had a leading role to play in designing a new world order 
and that the EC was the appropriate instrument for this endeavour, several leading social-
democratic figures like Mansholt were actively advocating the creation of a new ‘progressive’ 
or ‘socialist’ European party.xxxiii
xxxiv
xxxvi
 Recent research has highlighted the growing levels of formal 
and informal cooperation of European social democrats during the 1970s and discussed to what 
extent they were able to further influence European and EC policies.  In April 1974, the 
socialist parties of the EC had enhanced their cooperation with the inauguration of the 
Confederation of Socialist Parties of the EC (CSPEC), whose new officers – President Wilhelm 
Dröscher, vice-presidents Sicco Mansholt, Robert Pontillon and Ivar Nørgaard – enjoyed a 
much more prestigious stature than their predecessors. The new rules of procedure introduced 
majority voting for some decisions and opened possibilities for the adoption of binding 
decisions.xxxv This was meant to mark a new start in the parties’ transnational cooperation and 
to reinforce the socialist parties’ political influence in the Community. Actually, the 
institutional improvements enabled by the reform were limited. As Christian Salm argues 
however, despite evident difficulties in improving formal cooperation throughout the 1970s – 
the first Congress of the CSPEC only took place in 1979 – informal cooperation increased 
significantly during the second half of the decade, at EC level and beyond. In November 1974, 
the first party leaders’ summit of socialist parties of the EC was held in The Hague, inaugurating 
a routine of summit meetings.  
Meanwhile, European socialists worked on defining common political lines. In the early 
1970s, they had started to formulate their project to build a ‘social Europe’. The idea, as 
mentioned earlier, was to use the EC as an instrument to make Western Europe the most 
advanced ‘model’ of social progress in the world.  This project was enthusiastically supported 
by Brandt himself at the table of the European Council, in particular during the October 1972 
Paris summit, and it was at the heart of a pioneering programmatic document adopted by the 
socialist parties of the EC in Bonn in April 1973: ‘For a Social Europe’.xxxvii This ‘social Europe’ 
project entailed both more supranational competences at EC level and increased transnational 
social and economic coordination of governments at EC level. It included broad proposals 
regarding the right to work; ‘humanisation’ of the environment; a ‘Charter of fundamental 
social principles’ ensuring access to social protection for all; increased social planning at 
European level; income security and wealth redistribution (through directing investment, 
progressive taxation, asset-building policies, income-maintaining benefits); economic planning, 
economic democratization; and greater control over multinationals.xxxviii 
In November 1974, the bureau of the new CSPEC then proposed the drafting of a broad 
‘Common Programme’; it was later decided that this programme would be the basis of a 
common election manifesto for the European elections. The upcoming election of the EP was 
deemed a historic turn: it would confer a new democratic legitimacy to an Assembly that had 
already gained enhanced budgetary powers in recent years.xxxix
xliii
 At a time when socialist parties 
– and the European Left more broadly – virtually dominated the EC, this was no point of detail. 
After 1975, when the British Labour Party put an end to its EC boycott and sent a delegation of 
18 deputies to the EP, the Socialist Group became the largest European group with 66 members 
(out of 198, a third of the total number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)).xl 
Concomitantly, the Communists were also increasing their cooperation and presence in the EC 
institutions, especially after the PCI and the PCF were finally able to send delegations to the 
EP for the first time (in 1969 and 1973 respectively). In October 1973, the Communist and 
Allies Group of the EP had been officially created with fourteen members.xli By 1977 the 
socialists would be leaders or coalition partners in six out of nine governments of the EC – 
which could mean a majority at the table of the European Council. European socialists were 
also counting some important members in the European executive during those years: as 
Mansholt would be succeeded in the following years by Henk Vredeling, Antonio Giolotti, 
Claude Cheysson and Roy Jenkins who, in 1977, would take the head of the European 
Commission.xlii With the notable exception of the British Labour Party (and the Greek PASOK), 
European Socialists generally came to believe that the predominant position of the Left in 
European institutions was a crucial strategic tool to achieve a socialist EC; some argued that an 
alliance of the Left should be favoured against the threat of a coalition of centre-right parties.  
The work on the first European election manifesto – the ‘Common European Socialist 
Programme’ – began on an optimistic note under Mansholt’s lead. However, it soon became 
clear that the undertaking would not be as easy as the leaders initially hoped. The CSPEC 
created a working group headed by Dröscher in February 1975; then suspended its work in 
December; then created a Steering Committee still chaired by Dröscher in January 1976 to 
coordinate the activities of four sub-parties: on economic policy (chaired by Michel Rocard, 
French PS), social policy (chaired by Lionello Levi Sandri, Italian PSI), democracy and 
institutions (chaired by Schelto Patijn, PvdA), and external relations (Bruno Friedrich, SPD). 
All member parties appointed delegates for each working group, meeting for the first time in 
April 1976.xliv The working parties submitted their reports in mid-1977, after which a single 
draft election manifesto was adopted and circulated to the national parties for them to submit 
amendments by the end of November 1977. The idea was to incorporate amendments and then 
agree on a final version to be adopted at a Congress of EC socialist parties to be held in March 
1978, which should be put to European voters at the time of the first direct elections to the EP. 
This was a most ambitious plan considering the Socialists’ rather weak past record in outlining 
a common European policy programme. 
A closer look at the topics discussed in the working parties and the issues that arose from 
these discussions is useful to understand the outcome of this difficult undertaking. The themes 
initially debated were vast and reflected the ambition to imagine a Socialist programme for 
Europe that would entail a complete redefinition of European cooperation along socialist lines. 
The discussion included issues such as: capitalism and market economy, influence of the state, 
investment control, economic crisis and unemployment, control of multinationals, 
technological development and industrial policy, bureaucratisation and alienation, worker 
participation and self-determination, equality and fairness of the distribution of wealth, 
minimum incomes and pension systems, regional problems, energy problems, environmental 
questions, health policy, relations with the Third World and wealth redistribution, foreign and 
defence policies (role of NATO), etc.xlv Unsurprisingly, Mansholt, who would be one of the 
most active participants in the drafting of the common European Socialist Programme, raised 
the crucial question as early as the second meeting of the initial working party, on 24 September 
1975: 
 
Sicco MANSHOLT felt that the question of principle then arose as to whether 
European Socialists wanted to continue seeking partial solutions within a capitalist 
system or to establish a new political basis. DRÖSCHER emphasized that the SPD 
could not go beyond the Godesberg Programme.xlvi 
 
Although several members of the CSPEC – including the German SPD members – were not 
prepared to challenge their commitment to ‘market economy’, the question of the very essence 
of socialism and of overcoming capitalism remained a topic of heated debate among European 
socialists throughout the discussions on the common programme and for the entire second half 
of the 1970s. 
In a way, the 27-page draft election manifesto, adopted unanimously by the bureau of 
the CSPEC on 6 June 1977, was an updated and expanded version of the social Europe project 
that had been debated and matured by the socialists since the early 1970s.xlvii It included three 
sections: ‘democracy and institutions’, ‘economic and social policy’, and ‘external policy’. 
Economic and social questions constituted the bulk of the programme. One thing was made 
explicit from the outset: “it is only at European level that the conditions for the survival, 
development and fulfilment of our peoples and the conditions for a fairer distribution of the 
world’s wealth can be established”. European socialists advocated greater coordination 
between European countries, the realisation of new common policies, and the adoption of 
common positions regarding the energy crisis and the international monetary system. To 
surpass the construction of a merely business-oriented Europe, in the economic and social 
sphere European socialists advocated resetting the EC to support the broad principles of full 
employment, economic stability, a fairer distribution of income and wealth, an effective and 
democratic economic structure, economic democracy, improved social security, better working 
and living conditions, and improved educational opportunities. In the other fields, they 
promoted a democratisation of the EC institutions, a commitment to détente, peace and a new 
international economic order favouring the development of the Third World.  
Were European socialists merely advocating a coordination of European economies 
along Keynesian lines or were they leaning towards more ‘radical’ solutions in order to get out 
of the crisis – a solution that would encroach on the capitalist structure of Western European 
societies? The manifesto remained so ambiguous on most points that it was actually hard to tell. 
Regarding the critical questions of the extension of the public sector, of economic planning and 
economic democracy, it was somehow running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. Far 
from envisaging clear coordinated social and economic planning at European level, the text 
recognised that different measures may be required in individual Member States:  
 
the magnitude of the problems with which some of them have to contend may lead 
them to use economic planning techniques and possibly to extend the area of state 
influence. To create an efficient and effective industrial structure planning systems 
must, where appropriate, be devised to mobilise capital for the development of 
cooperative and private undertakings, to facilitate cooperation on development 
projects between the private and the public sector, and, where necessary, to promote 
direct investment in production undertakings by public institutions. When applying 
such measures, Socialists will adhere to Community law and ensure that the market 
continues to function properly. It is extremely important to achieve structural 
balance among undertakings and this involves promoting small and medium-sized 
firms. Supervision over firms in dominant market positions and of concentrations 
of undertakings must be extended at Community level to prevent the development 
of monopolies and to ensure compliance with the rules of competition and price 
formation.xlviii  
 
In other words, economic planning and nationalisations may be used by socialists in 
government – although it was specified, in line with the concerns that the new social movements 
had brought to the fore, that “stronger state planning requires democratic control and 
decentralisation”. There was however a clear commitment to a ‘mixed economy’ model and no 
consensus on the need to extend nationalisations or ‘Europeanisations’ of industries and of the 
banking system. The need for greater control of private investments and of multinational 
companies was advocated but remained limited and vague. Regarding economic democracy, 
which was still emphasised as one of the backbones of a ‘socialist Europe’, the same ambiguity 
prevailed: the manifesto proposed an à la carte menu for the participation of the workers in the 
economic direction of enterprises , whether it was in the form of “worker representation on the 
management bodies of public and private firms, joint management on an equal basis, the 
extension of the negotiating powers of unions in all sectors of the firms’ activity, or worker 
control”.  
Beside these cautious suggestions, the socialist manifesto put forward a set of proposals 
that belonged to what could be considered a renewed ‘Keynesian’ approach: it insisted on the 
need to favour “humane growth” by investing in collective needs such as health, welfare 
services, culture and education, by promoting energy research and development, and investing 
on developing industry, trade and the service sector. This, combined with an unprecise 
‘considerable’ shortening of working hours and extension of annual holidays and targeted 
professional training, would help redeem growth and restore full employment. The most 
ambitious proposals were perhaps the ones that regarded cooperation with developing countries 
(for instance the concrete proposal to devote 1% of the GNP of EC countries to development 
aid).  
It could be contended however that with this manifesto, European socialists at least left 
the door open for ‘social Europe’ to go one step beyond a broadly Keynesian model of ‘welfare 
capitalism’. Some of the proposals were indeed advocating – or at least envisaged – the adoption 
of policies that could have attacked some of the principles of the then prevailing capitalist 
framework: the ones regarding the extension of the public sector, economic planning and 
workers’ control in particular, but also some proposals regarding the redistribution of income 
and wealth in Europe (implementing strongly progressive fiscal policies, increasing taxes on 
large fortunes, imposing a more progressive distribution of the burden of taxes and social 
security distribution, fighting tax evasion, encouraging workers’ savings, realising greater 
transparency regarding incomes in all sectors of society). This ‘social Europe’ therefore tended 
towards more than simply transposing to the EC level the same Keynesian policies that had 
characterised the ‘postwar compromise’ in West European countries – it envisaged a 
coordinated action to increase control over multinationals, policies to carry out a redistribution 
of wealth within Western Europe and towards the ‘global South’, and the extension of economic 
democracy. 
In any case, by the beginning of 1978 the manifesto was in disarray, as most national 
parties objected to the wording of the manifesto. The SPD and the PvdA alone had together 
proposed over sixty amendments; and many national parties had already drafted their own 
programmes for the elections.xlix The bureau engaged efforts on preparing a revised version of 
the programme, but a political commitment by party leaders appeared necessary to solve the 
problem. In June 1978 in a summit meeting in Brussels, the socialist party leaders of the ‘Nine’ 
signed a 31-points ‘Political Declaration’ on the basis of a text prepared by the bureau of the 
CSPEC, and presented it to a crowd of European journalists.l The declaration was a watered-
down version of the election manifesto; it was intended to be a general framework of basic 
principles to guide the parties’ European policy instead of a binding common programme. As 
most commentators were quick to point out, the ‘Political Declaration’ was not much more than 
a vague summary of socialist principles with hardly any concrete proposals for a common 
policy. To solve this problem, the bureau was charged to draft another document in view of the 
upcoming elections, an ‘Appeal to the Electorate’ that was presented and adopted at the 10th 
Congress of the CSPEC in Brussels in January 1979: a series of joint proposals that the parties 
committed “to defend in each country and in the European Parliament”.li Both the ‘Declaration’ 
and the ‘Appeal’ contained the same ambiguity as the manifesto in their approach to the 
questions that had been at the heart of the heated discussions within European socialist circles 
since the late 1960s: the question of capitalism remained unresolved and would still be open 
for several years. During the Congress, with the exception of the agreement of all parties to 
promote a reduction of working time to 35 weekly hours, divergences between the parties were 
hard to reconcile. In the following years, European socialists’ inability to decide and agree on 
a clear line and the outcome of their internal power struggle ultimately determined the fate of 
their socialist alternative.  
 
Persisting Divisions among the European Left: The Lost Opportunity 
 
The divergences that existed at that stage within social democracy had actually been taking the 
shape, to some extent, of a power struggle. Gradually, the ‘radical’ wing of the family would 
end up rallying to a more ‘moderate’ stance and would progressively abandon its claims to 
break with capitalism. The conflict that had opposed Mitterrand against Schmidt during the 
1970s would eventually turn to the advantage of the latter. Mitterrand’s attempt to federate 
socialist parties of ‘Southern Europe’ and to hegemonize his line within the socialist movement 
in the mid-1970s turned out to be a failure. The ‘first Conference of the socialist parties of 
Southern Europe’ organised in Paris on 24 and 25 January 1976 by the Parti Socialiste (PS) had 
intended to unite socialists from Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Belgium and Luxembourg 
around the ideas of self-management, democratic economic planning, extension of the public 
sector, and alliances with communists.lii By doing so, Mitterrand quite explicitly attempted to 
assert his conception of socialism in Europe in order to reassert his party’s position within the 
SI and to shift the balance in his favour, to the detriment of the SPD. But Mitterrand had 
underestimated the work that Northern social democrats, especially the German SPD, were 
carrying out to influence Iberian and Italian socialists at the time and to bring them around to a 
more ‘moderate’ (and anti-communist) stance.liii  
The question of the relations with communists that had for many years been subject to 
heated disputes within socialist circles, and that conditioned the possibility of an alliance of the 
Left for a socialist alternative in Europe, also ended with a victory for the anti-communist stance. 
The leadership of the German SPD, especially its most moderate figures like Schmidt, had been 
particularly opposed to any form of collaboration with communist forces. It had actively 
worked to repress, internally, the Jusos’ stark interest for Western European communist forces 
(especially for the PCI), and even supported in West Germany the adoption of the 
Radikalenernass, a decree that discriminated left-wing ‘radicals’ in their access to public 
services and that provoked indignation inside the European Left.liv Despite the 1972 decision 
of the Bureau of the SI to allow its members to decide freely on how to arrange their bilateral 
relations with communist forces, within the SI, the CSPEC and the SGEP, the question 
remained intensely debated throughout the decade.lv At the Elsinore Summit of socialist party 
leaders in 1976, which took place just a few days before the PS’ ‘Southern European’ 
conference, the question created visible tension.lvi Recent research has highlighted the role of 
US diplomacy in determining the closing down of social democrats towards the ‘communist 
question’, and the role that the US, UK, French and German governments played in blocking 
the progress of communist forces in Western and Southern Europe.lvii Towards the end of the 
decade, the electoral regression of communist forces, the loss of impetus of the ‘Eurocommunist’ 
project and the progression of the ‘anti-communist’ stance within social democracy gradually 
converged to deny the possibility of an alliance of the European Left for a ‘radical’ socialist 
alternative. 
In fact, the efforts of socialist parties to increase cooperation and agree on a common 
programme in view of the first European elections at least in part contributed to the deterioration 
of the alliance between the French socialists and communists, whose union was experiencing 
great difficulties by 1977. The common programme adopted by the CSPEC in June 1977 was 
perceived by the PCF as treason to the common programme of the Left. It raised serious 
controversy between the two parties. The communist press underlined the ‘social-democratic’ 
orientation of the programme and its incompatibility with the Programme Commun. lviii 
Comparing the two common programmes, L’Humanité argued that they conflicted on every 
aspect of foreign, social and economic policy and attacked the common programme of the 
European socialists as making allegiance to the interests of capital – putting the public sector 
at the service of the private sector, reproducing the employers’ arguments and demands, 
confiscating economic democratisation from the workers to entrust it to the technocratic organs 
of Brussels.lix It highlighted the differences in the position adopted by the PS in the April 1973 
Bonn theses ‘For a Social Europe’ compared to the 1977 common programme – in particular 
regarding nationalisations and self-management, two highly sensitive issues for the PS-PCF 
alliance. The PS, naturally, denied these accusations.lx 
However, the French socialists did at the same time operate a rapprochement with their 
ally-rivals of the SPD. During the first half of the decade, Mitterrand had been openly hostile 
to the SPD that he considered the emblem of the ‘old’ social democracy that had chosen 
compromise over rupture towards the capitalist system. Christelle Flandre highlighted the 
ideological gulf which separated the two parties during the 1970s, epitomised in the expression 
“Epinay against Bad Godesberg”.lxi Nevertheless, after a series of meetings between Mitterrand 
and Brandt in 1976, the two parties established joint working groups to reach common positions 
on important issues in particular regarding Europe, development policy and economic and 
social policy. This culminated in a common declaration released by Brandt and Mitterrand in 
February 1978.lxii The rapprochement between the two men increased the possibilities of a 
consensus of European socialists on a common European line – a year before the first EP 
elections. By the same token, it decreased the possibility of an alliance of socialist and 
communist forces at the European level. There was a clear tension in Mitterrand’s strategy of 
working on both fronts, with communists and with social democrats, at the European level.  
The search for consensus therefore contributed to leading socialist parties progressively 
abandoning the more radical stance that they had adopted in relation to capitalism and the EC 
in the early 1970s. Yet, divergences persisted among European socialists, and the ambiguities 
of the ‘Appeal to the Electorate’ hardly helped make a convincing case for a socialist alternative 
for Europe. In June 1979, the first direct elections of the EP marked a setback for the socialist 
and social-democratic parties of the EC. The SGEP remained the largest group in the assembly, 
with 113 seats out of 410, but high representation of the European People’s Party (EPP, the 
Christian democrats, 107 seats), the European Democrats (ED, including British and Danish 
Conservative Parties, 64 seats) and the Liberal and Democratic Group (LD, 40 seats) 
significantly undermined their position. While they used to hold a third of the seats in the old 
parliament, in the new directly-elected European Parliament, European socialists only held 27% 
of the new seats. The Communist and Allies Group won 44 seats, 24 of which belonged to the 
PCI.  
Meanwhile, in West Germany and in the UK, socialist-led governments were turning 
gradually rightwards. In the UK, although the majority of the Labour Party rejected austerity 
policies, from March 1976 the new right-leaning Labour leader Callaghan ignored the 
Alternative Economic Strategy. After a run on the sterling that led to heavy borrowing from the 
IMF, and later constrained by an alliance with the Liberals, Callaghan chose to favour deflation 
policy, undertook cuts in public spending and abandoned his priority on full employment. In 
West Germany, against ‘stagflation’, Schmidt was increasingly critical towards Keynesian 
formulas, keen to abandon deficit spending policies and to adopt economic ‘rigour’. After the 
second oil crisis in 1979 in particular, he called for economic and financial discipline, harping 
on the need for balanced budgets to prevent excessive currency fluctuations and inflation. 
Contrary to what most social democrats had advocated during the decade, he supported the 
Bundesbank’s stance in favour of an all-out fight against inflation through control of the money 
supply. Schmidt had long distanced himself from the ongoing leftward tendency in the Socialist 
International and appeared much more straightforwardly liberal than his predecessor; he had 
never approved his party’s strategy when they condemned international capitalism and 
advocated state intervention, regulatory control over private enterprise, and cooperation with 
developing countries.lxiii In the two countries, the social democrats in government adopted new 
priorities designed to restore growth: policies aimed at fighting inflation by containing wages, 
restraining public spending, encouraging private investment, adopting a new ‘monetarist’ 
doctrine, and so on.lxiv By the early 1980s, at the level of the EC, the short-lived dominance of 
social-democratic forces was coming to a close. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher took office as 
Prime Minister in the UK and would ensure, together with her counterpart Ronald Reagan in 
the US, the international hegemonizing of the new deflationary and ‘monetarist’ doctrine. 
The historic victory of the French Socialists in 1981 did not end this trend. When the French 
government proposed a memorandum to relaunch Europe based on most the socialists’ 
proposals just after coming to power, Schmidt ignored it just as much as Thatcher. In March 
1983 already, after a series of devaluations and in order to be allowed to stay in the European 
Monetary System (EMS), the French government renounced its efforts to build ‘socialism in 
one country’ and affected a radical change of economic policy: deflationary policy, budget 
restrictions, reversal of nationalisations, and partial financial deregulation. Jacques Delors, then 
Minister of Economics and future president of the European Commission, took the lead in this 
new austerity policy. The ideological renunciations of the French PS after it came to power – 
best exemplified by this so-called “tournant de la rigueur” – signalled in a way the end of 
European social democracy’s leftwing golden age, or at least the beginning of its transition into 
what Jean-Pierre Garnier and Louis Javoner would presciently term in a 1986 pamphlet “La 
deuxième droite” (The second Right).lxv After this setback, in Greece and in Spain, where the 
socialists formed a government in 1981 and 1982 respectively, budgetary rigour, monetary 
stability and sound public finances prevailed over the objective of full employment. By 1983, 
the Bennite current of the Labour Party was receding, and so were the left factions in all other 
European parties until they had become practically inexistent by the 1990s.lxvi  
 
Conclusion: Renouncing Socialist Europe 
 
In the following years, European socialists’ failure to formulate a real socialist alternative for 
Europe and to exert decisive influence on European policy-making in those years would have 
important consequences. In a 1978 report of the Confederation of socialist parties of the EC’s 
working group on Employment chaired by Joop den Uyl, the conclusion stated: 
 
There is a final, fundamental problem that must be faced by Socialists. In recent 
years social democrats have come to take for granted that steady growth and full 
employment were attainable in a capitalist economy. They have sought merely to 
tame capitalism by bringing it under greater public control and making it accept the 
growing burdens of the welfare state. There is now increasing evidence that this 
policy is reaching a dead end. With labour costs increasing and profits declining in 
many industries, we can no longer rely on the private accumulation of capital to fuel 
the expansion and create the jobs we need. Private investment is seeking 
increasingly to escape the burdens of the welfare state by concentrating on the 
industrial rationalisation which dispenses with labour or by diverting its resources 
overseas where greater profits can be made with lower labour costs. Socialists 
therefore face a choice. On the one hand they can rely on the profit motive which 
can only operate effectively by abandoning the traditional social democratic goals 
of full employment and higher public expenditure, or they can supplant the private 
accumulation of capital by far greater state control (and workers’ control) over the 
investment process than they have so far contemplated. It is this problem which 
should now engage the attention of Socialists.lxvii 
 
This almost prophetic analysis of the historical choice they were facing shows just how lucid 
European socialists were about the situation. In the following years, as is well known, they 
would choose to renew their commitment to a capitalist economic model and would abandon 
not just the ‘radical’ claims for rupture, but also the traditional social democratic goals of full 
employment and higher standards of welfare state.  
By the 1980s and up until today, the new slogan vulgarized by Margaret Thatcher to 
justify her anti-popular reforms – There is No Alternative – would become symptomatic of the 
forcefulness of the new conventional wisdom. According to this emerging, often called 
‘neoliberal’ wisdom, ‘globalisation’ would be an unstoppable force leading towards increasing 
global competition that inevitably imposed wage restriction, flexibilization of the labour market, 
public sector cuts, privatisation, welfare state reform, and limitation of redistributive policies. 
In a way, the radical-leftist French economist and philosopher Frédéric Lordon encapsulates 
the problem faced by European socialists when he provocatively declares that he agrees with 
Thatcher: “It is true, there is no alternative within the structural frame that we currently live 
in”. Indeed – he explains – within a framework characterised by free movement of capital, free 
trade, liberalisation of direct investments, and the policy “orthodoxy” of balanced budgets and 
deflationary policies, it is not possible to carry out a series of socialist policies without taking 
extremely severe macroeconomic risks. The only alternative would be to reset the entire 
framework.lxviii 
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, there were alternatives within reach. One of them 
could have built upon the ‘social Europe’ plan that European socialists tried to formulate during 
these years. As this contribution shows, the Western European Left was much more engaged in 
formulating and coordinating new answers to the crisis of the 1970s than is usually assumed by 
historians. To be sure, their failure to impose their socialist alternative back then was less due 
to their incapacity to think of solutions to the demise of the so-called ‘Keynesian’ consensus 
than to their difficulty to actually agree on the right answer and to impose it at the supranational 
level. The French socialists’ renunciation of their policy programme after 1983 did not just 
signal the failure of ‘socialism in one country’ – it also painfully revealed European socialists’ 
failure to use the European Community to implement a ‘social Europe’ based on redistribution, 
equality, social and economic planning and ‘democracy in all spheres of life’.lxix It marked their 
acceptance of another kind of ‘social Europe’: one whose function was to accompany and 
“humanise” the market. The ‘social Europe’ promoted by Delors during his time at the head of 
the European Commission, which was conceived as a counterpart to the liberalization trend of 
the Single European Act and the Economic and Monetary Union, corresponded to this latter 
conception. 
As Sassoon put it, with the crisis of the 1970s “a new political conflict ensued between 
social democrats and conservatives. The previous combat between the two – in the 1950s and 
1960s – had centred round the distribution of the surplus. In the 1970s and 1980s, the new 
‘positional warfare’ – to use Gramsci’s expression – was over the role of the state in the 
reorganization of capitalist relations. The Left tried to extend the prevailing regulatory regime 
even further. The Right advocated a substantial retrenchment of the state and the liberalization 
of a market expanded by privatization”.lxx Most historians and social scientists now agree that 
neoliberalism only pretends to be about liberalization and less state intervention, but in fact 
requires active state, legal and institutional intervention to ‘encase’ the market: to shelter it from 
the risks of mass democracy with the goal to achieve a complete protection of private capital 
rights. lxxi Europe – and in particular the European Community – was one of the decisive 
battlefields where this combat took place. The failure to realise their ‘social Europe’ contributed 
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